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FREE TRADE OR MANAGED TRADE:
IMPLICATIONS FOR NORTH DAKOTA FARMERS

Curtis W. Stofferahn

Department of Sociology
Peace Studies Faculty
University of North Dakota

Introduction

Agricultural trade conflicts have escalated as major western economies

have begun to subsidize their farm exports in an effort to gain or retain
market shares. At the heart of this agricultural trade conflict is the escalating

subsidies race between the United States and the European Economic Com
munity.

Total US farm exports soared in just ten years (1971-1981) from $8 billion

to $45 billion (Figure 1). Since then they fell dramatically to $28 billion in
1986.

Simultaneously, the Economic Community expanded its value of

agricultural export trade from $5 billion dollars in 1971to $28 billion in 1981.
By 1986, the EEC value of world agricultural export trade had fallen to $25

billion. In wheat, the high point of American exports was 1973-74 when the
United States accounted for almost 50 percent (metric tons) of the world
wheat market (Figure 2). In 1985-86 the US share had dropped to 29 percent.
In 1973-74, the Economic Community had an eight percent share of the world

wheat market, but by 1986-87 it had increased its share to slightly more than
18 percent.

These agricultural trade conflicts have brought the world's major

agricultural producers to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade^
(GATT) bargaining table. Two of the major players have offered radically

' Hk General Agreement on Taiiflis andTradegrew out of deliberatims tni*iat<»H
United States foUowing World War II to

the

the groundwotfc for an Tntematinnal Trade

Oiganizatioo. The oommerdal section of the Havana Convention of 1948 survived as the

General Agreement oo Tarins and Trade (GATU.
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different proposals. The European Economic Community's (EEC)^ proposal
is unacceptable to the US negotiators, while the United States' (US) proposal
is unacceptable to European Community negotiators. The purpose of this
paper is to discuss the origins of these trade conflicts, to examine the
differences between the two proposals being considered to relieve these

conflicts, and to consider the likely impacts of these proposals on North
Dakota agricultural producers.
Agriculture and World Trade in the 1980's

Agricultural Trade and the Farm Crisis

The United States and other western countries attempted to control
inflation in the 1980s byrestricting the money supply and raising interestrates.
This anti-inflationary effort, however, plunged the world economy into a
recession that reduced demand but did not reduce supply (Epstein and
Womack, 1987). Extra production capacity was coming on linejust as demand

was declining. Rapidly rising interest rates increased the costs of production
for fanners and of servicing the debt for developing countries. The increased
debt'service load, in turn, restricted developing countries' demand. Develop
ing countries, under economic austerity measures imposed on them by the
International Monetary Fund, increased agricultural export production in
order to ser\ice their debts, further driving down prices.
In the UnitedStates, farm prices and asset values dropped precipitously,
leading to the farm financial crisis of the early 1980's. Because of the farm
crisis and policy inflexibilities, the United States was unable to lower farm

support prices. Thus, the very US commodity programs that encouraged
production during the 1970's when export demand was increasing continued
to encourage US production in the 1980's when export demand slackened.

Rather than moving these commodities onto the export market, these
programs instead drew these supplies into government storage (Epstein and

* European Oxomuoity Countries include Belgium, Dcomait, Frana, Germany, Greece,

Ireland, Itafy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poitu^ Spain, and theUnited KingdooL
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Womack, 1987).

«.

Commodity support prices, combined with a rapidly appreciating dollar,
priced US exports out ofexport markets and stimulated production in other
exporting countries (National Center for Food and Agricultmal Policy, 1988).
Therefore, price support programs tended to set a commodity price below
which competing exporters could bid. Thus, the United States became a
residual supplier and storage holder for the world. Besides selling their
commodities below US prices to avoid accumulating stocks, other exporting
countries also stepped up production to take advantage of US acreage
reduction programs (Epstein and Womack, 1987).

Afficiiltural Trade Wars

Under the presence ofexcess supplies, practically all developed countries
became exporters ofagricultural products. They also became involved in a

desperate scramble for markets (National Center for Food and Agricultural
Policy, 1988). The result was a buyer's market that created intense competi
tion among exporting countries that resorted to both direct and indirectsubsidies to preserve and ejqjand their export volumes and market- shares
(Epstein and Womack, 1987).

The Reagan administration blamed the EEC's export subsidies for the.
decline in US export shares. Particularly disconcerting to the Reagan
administration wasthe factthat the United States operated expensive acreage

reduction programs to reduce supplies while the Economic Community used
export subsidies to export its increasing surpluses (Vogt and Womack, 1986).
The administration contended that the EEC's export subsidies were stealing

US export shares. According to the administration, this theft was illegal under
GATT agreements that forbid export subsidies on primary products in a
manner that displaces other trading countries' markets by "more than an
equitable share ofthe world export trade in such a product."
This alleged loss of markets to the Economic Community did not go

unchallenged (Vogt and Womack, 1986). US agribusinesses, representing
48

https://openprairie.sdstate.edu/greatplainssociologist/vol3/iss1/4

4

Stofferahn: Free Trade or Managed Trade

wheat flour, citrus, pasta, sugar, poultry, canned fruits and raisins, brought
complaints against the Economic Community under GATT rules. These
complaints allowed the United States to challenge the EEC's alleged unfair
foreign trade practices and to petition for their removal through dispute
settlement procedures established in the GATT.
Besides these complaints, the administration began several actions to stop

what it saw as an erosion of market shares (Vogt and Womack, 1986). First,

it provided cheap credit to finance foreign purchases of US farm products.
Second, by using subsidies, it undercut the EEC price in a sale of wheat flour
to Egypt. Third, it used cheap credit vnth a three-year extended interest-free
payment to sell dairy products to Egypt.

When these actions did not increase US agricultural exports, the

administrationbegan to harden its stance on the loss of export markets (Vogt
and Womack, 1986). Under US law, the administration may take retaliatory
action against EEC trade practices that GATT determines have injured US
exports. After GATT had ruled that EEC actions had resulted in loss of

citrus markets for the United States, the administration imposed tariffs on
EEC pasta.- The Economic Community countered this retaliatory measure
with tariffs on US walnuts and lemons.

US Ag^ailtural Policy Responses
While the pasta war was developing, the administration began the &cport

Enhancement Program (EE?) in June 1985 (Vogt and Womack, 1986). The
purpose of the EEP wasto offercommodities as bonuses to US exporters who
expanded sales of US agricultural commodities to targeted markets that had
been "unfairly taken" by foreigncompetitors. In particular, the administration
announced that the EEP would target markets where the Economic Com
munity had gained a substantial market share in wheat and wheat flour
markets between 1979 and 1983 while the US share of those markets had

declined. Congress later incorporated the EEP into the FoodSecurity Act of
1985.

49
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In response to the inability to gain access to protected markets and the
domestic farm crisis, Congress passed the Food Security Actof1985. The act
had two major objectives (Tutwiler and Rossmiller, 1987). First, the act was
intended to maintain farm incomes during the farm financial crisis. Therefore,

target prices were frozen during the first two years ofthe act. Second, the act
attempted to make US agriculture competitive in international markets.
Accordingly, theact established loan rates at 75 percent of a moving average
ofworld market prices with the Secretary ofAgriculture given the discretion
to reduce them further if necessary. Additionally, the act included an export
enhancement program.

The enactment of the Food Security Act coincided with several
interrelated conditions that were affecting world agricultural economy (Alien

et. al, 1988): the fall in the value of the dollar, an inability of developing
countries to repay the loans they took out at high interest rates in the 1970's,
and world markets glutted with more grain than could be sold without the

help of export subsidies. Together the Food Security Act and the Export
Enhancement Program had the effect of raising the cost to the Economic
Community and other exporters of their subsidies of production and^e^orts
(National Center for Food and Agricultural Policy, 1988).
The European Community, however, was unwilling to be subsidized into
submission, and instead it matched the US subsidy dollar for dollar.

According to EEC officials, the Economic Community did not unfairly expand
its exports. Their opinion is that every sale has been legitimate under the
agreed GATT rules on subsidies. The result was an unwinable subsidy war
(National Center for Food and Agricultural Policy, 1988).
In a battle for export markets, the United States and the Economic
Community spent billions to subsidize the exports oftheir farmers' products
(International Summit, 1987a: 1). In1986 the United States spent $2 billion
to subsidize rice exports worth only $500 million, $6 billion to subsidize corn
exports worth only $2 billion, and $4 billion to subsidize wheat exports worth
$2 billion.

50

https://openprairie.sdstate.edu/greatplainssociologist/vol3/iss1/4

6

Stofferahn: Free Trade or Managed Trade

Pressures for Reform ofAfficultural Trade Policy

The cost of domestic price support programs for agriculture became
immense and intolerable both in the United States and the Economic

Community (Tutwiler and Rossmiller, 1987). These costs were rising at a
particularly alarming rate in recent years. The US farm program cost the
taxpayers over $26 billion in 1986 compared with $3 billion in 1980. Since
1979, the agricultural budgetcostsin the Economic Community havedoubled,
andin 1987 agricultural expenditures consumed 72percent ofthe total budget.
In 1988, the CAP cost the EEC taxpayers almost $25 billion.

Export subsidies for wheat, feed grains, and cotton, including deficien(^
payments, marketing loans, and export enhancement payments, costnearly$18
billion. Thesesubsidies amounted to almost fourteen percent of the total US

budget deficit. Paradoncally, the total value of the exports of these crops was
only $9.2 billion, costing the US taxpayers $2 in subsidies for every $1 in
exports (International Summit, 1987a: 1-2).
Besides the increasingbudget outlays, other costs have to be includedin

calculating the total costs of these programs. Consumers in Japan, the
Economic Community, and the United States also pay for farm programs
through higher food prices. The estimated total costs to consumers and
taxpayers of agricultural subsidies in industrialized countries in 1979-1981 were
$100 billion. For 1984-86 the estimated costs of these subsidies totalled $220

billion (Allen et al., 1988).

The net effect of these costs was to bring agricultural exporting countries
quickly to the negotiating table (Allen et al., 1988). Countries that subsidize

little or not at all, largely represented by the Cairns' Group,® saw the United
States and the Economic Community taking markets they had developed at
considerable cost to their farmers. The Economic Community, the major
target of US action, felt the impact in their agricultural budget outlays as the
cost of export restitutions rose.
' The Cairns' Group is an association of thirteen countries-Argentina, Australia, Brazil,
Canada, Columbia, Chile, Fiji, Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Thai
land, Uruguay.
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Proposals for Reform of Agricultural Trade

' The Economic Community and the United States have presented two

major proposals for reform of agricultural trade to the Uruguay Round of
GATT negotiations (see Rossmiller, 1988).
The US Proposal

The objective oftheUS proposal is to eliminate over tenyears all tradedistorting policies affecting all commodities inall countries. The US proposal
argues that all contracting parties should first agree on the extent of policy
coverage of an aggregate measure of support and estimates of support
provided by each country.

the United States proposes using theProducer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE)
as a measure of aggregate support provided to each country's farmers. The
PSEis a measure of income benefit to producers derived through the policies
that each country has in place. Policies to be included in the PSEinclude any
that directly or indirectly subsidize agriculture, such as market price support,
income support, and other supports.

Furthermore, the United States proposes the total elimination within ten

years of all subsidies paid to farmers. The PSE would be used as an allinclusive indicator of the amountof support each country provides to farmers.

The only policies to be permitted under the US proposal which would hotbe
included in the PSE would be direct income or other payments decoupled

from production and marketing, and foreign and domestic aid programs.
Regarding barriers to market access, theUS proposal requires eliminating all
import barriers to trade over ten years.
The EEC Proposal

The objective ofthe EEC proposal is to reduce supply- imbalance effects
ofmajor countries' commodities. It proposes to achieve this balance through
market sharing arrangements with the major exporting countries. It also

proposes to reduce significantly agricultural support levels. As part of its
short-term negotiating position, the Economic Community wants all contract52
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ing parties to GATT to agree first on short-term measures to stabilize world
markets and to reduce budget outlays. Its long-term negotiating position is to
reduce general support levels while preserving market shares.
The Economic Community proposes using a PSE measure of support

with a 1984-1985 baseline. However, it proposes modifying the PSE to
account for supply control measures already undertaken and using a fixed
external reference price to avoid complications from fluctuating world prices
and exchange rates.
In the short-term, the Economic Community proposes stabilizing world
markets for cereals through market sharing, for dairy by all countries adhering

to the GATT International Dairy Agreement, for sugar by sugar importers

maintaining access at past levels. It also proposes freeing support for rice,
sugar, oilseeds, dairy, and beef/veal at 1984 levels.

On the question of agricultural subsidies, the Economic Community
proposes reducing levels of support over the long-term and improving rules
specifying types and circumstances for the use of subsidies.

Regarding the issue of market access, the EEC proposal calls for re
adjusting measures used to achieve market stabilitygoals. This would involve
reducing some barriers and raising others. The Economic Community firmly

maintains that the CAP two-price system is not negotiable.
To carry out its proposal, the Economic Community proposes improving
and supplementing eristing GATT rules to fit newconditions. It also proposes
accommodating state trading and allowing for tighter surveillance of trade.
Analysis of Proposals

Basic to the US proposal is the belief that everyone would benefit more
under free trade than under managed trade. In contrast, the beliefunderlying

the EEC proposal is that stability and managed trade are preferable to the
increased risks involved in free trade. Europeans believe that the benefits
from increased efficiency under free trade are less than the gains realized
from trade liberalization.

Europeans view the US proposalas an ideological position that does not
53
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recognize political realities. The Economic Community sees the US position
as being inflexible and nonnegotiable. On the other hand, the United States
views the EEC proposal as consistent with its position since the Economic
Community founded the CAP. According tothe United States, the Economic

Community gives homage to the principles of trade liberalization, but its
intention isto close theCAP to permitted imports, to reduce CAP costs, and
to increase market prices through allocatiqn of market shares.
j

Gamers and Losersfrom Free Trade

The major proponent of the US proposal in Congress has been Sen. Rudy
Boschwitz (R-MN). Boschwitz has introduced domestic "decoupling"
legislation that would eliminate domestic farm support programs in order to
lower farm prices to "market-clearing" levels. Although the "decoupling
legislation includes equity payments, the amount provided is insufficient to
compensate producers for their loss of income. Furthermore, the "decoupling
legislation" schedules the gradual elimination of equity payments.
Inthe United States, producers and consumers would support free trade
if demand and prices increased substantially and defidency payments were
reduced to zero, even if consumer costs rose (Schmitz, 1988b). The only
losers would be consumers, but producers would support free trade. If
demand and prices do not increase, however, both consumers and producers

lose while taxpayers would gain. Producers would lose because the reduction
in government deficiency payments would be more than the increase in prices.
In this case, producers would oppose free trade.

Generally, most producer groups in the United States oppose free trade.
They believe quite correctly, that their incomes would decline under free trade
because the gain in prices would be insufficient to offset the reductions in
deficiency payments.

The major proponents of the US GATT proposal for free trade have been
the agribusiness sector (Schmitz, 1988a). Multinational grain firms profit from
large trade volumes and price instability, and they advocate policies that lower

export price in order to increase export volume (Schmitz, et al., 1986). Ob54
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viously, it is advantageous for exporting companies to have access to large
amounts of cheap grain to sell on volatile world markets where a few cents

price differential can result in multi-million dollar windfall proHts for them.

Thus, they have consistently demonstrated a fondness for policies that

advocate high target prices and low loan rates with "deficiency' payments, and
now"decoupling" payments, withthe publictreasurysubsidmng the difference.
In a similar vein, they fight policies advocating export cooperation that would
include production controls and market sharing. Agricultural supplyfirms also
champion policies expanding acreage that would increase their sales.

If agriculturalproductiontrulybecomes uncoupled from consumption, the
net cost to most exporters,including the United States, willincrease (Schmitz,
1988a). Although the volume of trade may wellbe large, the gainsfrom trade
will be offset by the cost to the treasury of maintaining agricultural and other
associated interests (Sarris and Schmitz, 1981).
Underlying these beliefs regarding agriculture and trade are the goals of
food security and the social organization of agriculture. Western European

countries want to maintain a small, family-sized farm structure and to keep
agricultural incomes on par with non-farm families (Rayand PlaMco, 1988).
Because of their experiences with food shortages during wartime and their

assessment of the consequences of food dependence. Western European
countries also encourage food self-sufficiency. Thus, the Economic Com

munity uses variable levies, high support prices, and export subsidies to
support its farmers.

With' their concern for food security, European consumers would not

derive any benefits from freetrade (Schmitz, 1988a). Instead, they may rather
prefer expanded output through higher prices from import protection.
Without compensation, European farmers will oppose free trade. Although
European taxpayers may gain from free trade, they maywewfree trade as a
cost rather than a sa\ings if it increases food insecurity and threatensthe rural
fabric of European agriculture.

To US economists, such policies are inefficient and costly to society as
measured against perfect competition and free trade. Although thesegoals
55
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may not appear rational from the point of view of economic efficiency, a

country's long-term well-being is only partially decided by economic factors.
Goals that are incompatible with the economic efficiency of the free market

are entirely reasonable and must be considered (Hallberg and Cho, cited in
Ray and Plaxico, 1988).
Gamers and Losers from Managed Trade

Under a model of export cooperation, the United States, Economic
Community, Canada, and other major exporters could form a grain export
cartel (Carter, et al., 1980; Schmitz, 1988a). To be effective, such a cartel
would require the major e}q)orters to have a cooperative production and

export policy. A cartel is "an association of producers or governments who
jointly determine levels of output, prices, and profits or returns" (Schmitz et
al., 1981:18). Those who propose a grain cartel as an international policy
alternative to deal with trade in grains do so with four possible objectives
(Schmitz et al., 1981: 17): to stabilize markets to prevent wide price swings;
to establish minimum prices to prevent price wars and maintain market
shares; to use them as a threat to induce importers to reduce trade barriers

to imports;to increaseinternational grain prices therebyimproving producers'
incomes and reduce importers economic gains.
A cartel could take several forms depending on its objective (Schmitz et

al., 1981). There are two major types of cartels- government and producer.
A governmental cartel ma^izes welfare for everyone- both producers and
consumers— in the exporting countries. It could result in lower grain prices
for domestic consumers than would otherwise be the case. On the other hand,

a producer cartel maximizes only producer welfare andwould result in higher
consumer prices.

A econometric assessment of a wheat grain cartel demonstrates that it

would yield substantial net welfare gains to major wheat-exporting countries
as compared to free trade (Schmitz, et al., 1981: 178-180). Within the
exporting countries, the type of cartel arrangement has implications for the
distribution of gains among producers and consumers.
56
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Under a producerwheatexportcartel,the imposition of an optimal export
tax would decrease by 28 percent the amount of wheat traded to 73 million
tons a year, increase the world price by 32 percent to $349 a ton, and increase

annual domestic consumption in the major exporting countries by about 24
percent.

The gain accruing to consumers of wheat for all uses in exporting
countries would be $5.4 billion a year. Thus, consumers in exporting coimtries
would support a government cartel because they have the most to gain from
it. Producers in exporting countries, however, ,are likely to oppose such a
cartel compared to free trade. Even if they receive the total export tax
revenue, their loss is estimated to be $1 billion a year. This suggests a
government cartel arrangement should be combined with a producer income
supplement.

Producers in exporting countries would support a producer wheat cartel

while consumers would oppose it. In this arrangement, prices would increase
by37percent to $362 a ton,and quantity traded would decrease by52percent.
Producers would gain about $6.9 billion a year while consumers would lose
about $3.6 billion.

Similar results were obtained for a feed grains export cartel (Schmitz et
al., 1981: 182-185). An important consideration involved in a feed grains
cartel is its impact on the livestock sector. A combined wheat-feed grains
cartel, however, would probably increase the total revenue to meat producers
by about 20 percent annually.

A cartel arrangement offers several advantages over current agricultural

policy (Schmitz et al., 1981: 288). First, many past agricultural policies would
not be necessary to support farm income. Rather than using the treasury to
support farm income, the support would come from importers. Currently,
importers extract this revenue through their domestic and international trade

policies. Second, a government export cartel would create internal price
stability by charging different prices for export than for domestic consumption.
Several barriers stand in the way ofimplementing a grain cartel (Schmitz
1989:139-140). Often mentioned as the key barrier to the success of a cartel
57
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is the problem ofsupply, management. This problem, however, should be a
serious barrier. Under a cartel arrangement, export volume maynot change ^
much since free trade does not exist in grains. In addition, the United States,

Canada, and Australia hold a large share ofthe export market. Therefore, a

grain cartel should be relatively easy to organize because afew countries make
up a large percentage ofexports. Because the livestock industry is a major
consumer offeed grains, its opposition to a cartel can be avoided ifthe cartel
pursues pricing strategies which recognize this sector.
Impacts of Trade Liberalization in North Dakota

Under the US proposal, market prices for most agricultural commodities
would rise with the greatest increases occurring for livestock products,

especially beef. Incomes for crop farmers, however, would plunge with the
abolition ofgovernment subsidies (International Agricultural Trade Research
Consortium, 1988).

The regional impacts ofthese reforms on farm incomes would depend on
the region's comparative advantage, crop mixture, and present .participation

in government programs. Because of the loss of deficiency payments, regions
specialmng in subsidized crops would lose much more than regions specializ
ing in non-subsidized crops. Generally, there would be no change in the value
of farm production in the Northern Plains (International Agricultural Trade ^
Research Consortium, 1988). The gross value of crops, however, would
decline by 14 percent while the value of livestock production would increase
by nine percent. Economists estimate that gross returns would fall by seven

percent, variable expenses would rise by ten percent, and net returns would
fall by 20 percent. The above analysis does not include compensation
payments that would be permitted in the US proposal.

Acursory examination of the estimated impact of the proposed decoupl
ing" le^slation on the grains and oilseeds sector, which represents 55 percent
of North Dakota's total farm receipts, shows the damaging impact of the
United States GATT proposal (Tables 1 -3). Because "decoupled" prices are

substantially below the costs of production, the total loss for one year without
58
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equity payments would be $1.29 billion dollars (Table 1). Even with equity
payments, however, the total loss for one year would be $758 million dollars
(Table 1). The taxpayer costs of the equity payments for one year in the state

alone would be $669 milliondollars (Table 2). This cost wouldbe $43million
more expensive than the cost of the present wheat and feed grain program in
1986.

A comparison of the US GATT "decoupling" proposal with the EEC

GAIT proposal, the superiority ofthe later is evident (Table 3)^. Because
the Economic Community's proposal bases support prices on an average cost

of production rather than some world market price below the cost of
production, the estimated revenue under the EEC proposal is 35 percent
higher than under the "decoupling" proposal and 23 percent higher than under
the present farm program.

North Dakota Farmers Reactions to US GATT Position

It should not be surprising that North Dakota farmers are reluctant to

embrace wholeheartedly the US GATT "decoupling" proposal. Except for
beef producers, most North Dakota farmers would suffer dramatic losses in
income under the "decoupling" proposal. In this scenario. North Dakota
producers would rather optimize their incomes through deficiency payments

than to promote exports by reducing trade barriers (Schmitz, et., 1981).
Results from the 1987ND Rural Life Poll demonstrate that 42 percent of

the farmers surveyed were opposed to reducing price supports. When asked
if production should be controlled to insure fair prices, almost 55 percent
responded positively.

* This analysis assumes that North Dakota's proportion of US market share would not
decrease under the EEC proposal. The Economic Community proposes that market shares be
established at a ten year average of each country's annual market share for a particular
commodity.
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Each year reflects a 20X reduction in soybean and sunflower payments and lOX

3091.2

32.2

Total Costs

391.2

289.82

1613.25

Hundredweight for sunflowers, all others bushels

Sunflowers

Uheat

23.1
13.3

38.50

.80

Soybeans
16.68

.60

Oats

51.2
158.4

175.95

49.29

(million
dollars)

.90

1.04

(million
(units)

Payments'^

Production^

Unit

(doliars)

Equity

Year One

Amount/

Barley -

Corn

Crop

Table 2. Taxpayer Costs of "Equity" Payments to ND Farmers as Stipulated in S-172
"Decoupling" Legislation.
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3.00
2.74

49. 29

143.26
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843.AO
542.70

1527.03

854.97
57.75

106.48

North D.ikota Agricultural SC.iclstics, 1987, Agricultural Statistics Report No. 56
North D.akoC.a Agricultural Scatlstlc.s. 1987, Agricultural Statistics Report No. 56

proposal.s.

1201.73

689.00

2.38

46.20
73.41

66.54
219.94

dollars)

6.60

Crop Revenue plus "equity" payments during first year. In each subsequent year, the
equity" payments would decUtie further widening Che difference between EEC and US

Hundredweight Cor sunClouers, all others bushels

am Payments$1827.73
Net Cain Under EEC Proposal Compared to S-1725
Net Gain Under EEC Proposal Compared to Existing Program

Feed Grains Program Payments In 1986

Ulient Program Payments In 1986

$1527.03

$1201.73
$ 511.09
$ 115.07

$2370.43

EsClmated Revenue Under S-1725
Value oC Production In 1966

2370.43

2.95

3.58

1394.03

4.81
8.88

289..82
1613 .25

4.40

57.75
71.72

1.50
4.30

113.46

2.33

6.80

1.35
1.25
1.20

115.34
369.50

2.34
2.10.

147.87

dollars)

Payments^

Deficiency

482.10
89.71

16,.68

175. 95
38. 50

($/uniC>

Payments

dollars)

1986

Decoupling

Equity
Propo.sal

Production

Propos.al

Prices^

(S/unlC)

Unit In

Under

Including

Co.scs of

Under EEC

1986

(millions)

Production

In 1986^

Price Per

Prices

Revenue At

Production

Minus

Value of

Average

Estimated
Revenue

Decoupling

Estimated

Costs of

Production

Revenue EsClmaCe Under EEC Proposal

Total

Sunflowers

Wheat

Soybeans

Oats

Barley

Corn

Otop

S -1725 "Decoupling"' LeglslaCion.
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These results were also found by another recent poll conducted by Rockwood Research (1988). In that poll, the majority of North Dakota farmers

voiced their opposition of the US proposal: 75 percent were opposed to
decoupling, and 71 percent were against lowering price supports for wheat.

In contrast, a majority of those farmers polled supported the concept of supply
management: 90 percent favored working through the farm program to
balance wheat production mth the demand of the market place, 75 percent
supported the right of foreign countries to design their own internal farm

policies without intervention from the US government, and 81 percent did not
think that a free market existed where the buying and selling of wheat was
concerned.

The ND Farmers Union, the largest farm organization in North Dakota,

has voiced its objections to the US proposal before GATT (Union Farmer,
1989). At its 1989 annual meeting, the North Dakota Farmers Union called

for cooperative agreements to stabilize world trade and opposed the direc
tions being taken by the US in trade talks within GATT. Farmers Union
President Alan Bergman said "we believe the unregulated free trade system

being proposed by the US would be a dangerous and destabilizing force in
world food production which would lead to boom and bust market cycles for
producers and devastating price swings for consumers." The Farmers Union
also opposed the continuation and escalation of international trade wars which

only serve to weaken market prices and lower income to producers.
In place of the current US position in world trade talks, President

Bergman said the Farmers Union wants to eliminate the use of export
subsidies which allow the dumping of agricultural products into the interna

tional marketplace at less than the cost of production. In addition, the
Farmers Union believes the right of nations to develop their own domestic
food security and supply-management programs should be recognized. They
want to develop international agreements which include minimum and
maximum pricing agreements and would establish international food reserves.

It also recommended that the US trade policies move away from free market

confrontations and reprisals and toward reciprocal trade arrangements.
63
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Conclusions

.<

The purpose of this paper has been to examine the economic and agricul
tural context in which agricultural trade conflicts have developed. Pressures

for reform of agricultural trade were identified, and the various proposals for
reform were discussed. A comparison of the EEC and US proposals

demonstrated substantial philosophical differences which are seemingly
unresolvable. These differences have ledto an impasse in GATT talks. Lost

in all the debate about trade proposals is the acceptability of the US proposal

for major agricultural groups in the US. Unless the US proposal offers
increased benefits over emsting policy, agricultural groups are unlikely to
embrace it wholeheartedly.

A comparison of the impacts of the US and EEC proposals on North
Dakota crop producers demonstrates the superiority of the EEC market
sharing and supply management proposal compared to the US decoupling
proposal. An econometric analysis of grain export cartels as compared to a
competitive market also demonstrates the superiority of a grain cartel
arrangement similar to that proposed by the European Community.
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